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Russian: A Monocentric  or Pluricentric Language?1
Abstract
All the world’s ‘big’ languages of international communication (for instance, 
English, French or Spanish) are pluricentric in their character, meaning that 
official varieties of these languages are standardized differently in those states 
where the aforesaid languages are in official use. The only exception to this 
tendency is Russian. Despite the fact that Russian is employed in an official 
capacity in numerous post-Soviet states and in Israel, it is still construed as a 
monocentric language whose single and unified standard is (and must be) solely 
1 I thank Filip Tomić (Ivo Pilar Institute of Social Sciences, Zagreb, Croatia) who in May 
2017 introduced me to the Deklaracija o zajedničkom jeziku (The Declaration on the Common 
Language). This document constituted a decisive impulse for writing this article. Rok Stergar 
(University of Ljubljana) kindly commented on an earlier draft. As usual, words of thanks go 
to Catherine Gibson (European University Institute), who commented in detail on the entire 
manuscript. I also appreciate the two Anonymous Reviewers’ helpful comments and suggestions 
for improvement. Obviously, it is me alone who is responsible for any remaining infelicities.
Some general ideas and conclusions included in this text were mentioned first in the online edi-
tion of New Eastern Europe, where on 9 February 2018 the article ‘Russian: Between Re-ethnici-
zation and Pluricentrism’ (Kamusella, 2018b) was published.
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controlled by Russia. From the perspective of sovereignty, this arrangement 
affords Moscow a degree of influence and even control over culture and language 
use in the countries where Russian is official. This fact was consciously noticed 
and evoked some heated discussions in Ukraine after the Russian annexation of 
the Ukrainian region of Crimea in 2014. However, thus far, the discussions have 
not translated into any official recognition of (let alone encouragement for) state-
specific varieties of the Russian language.
Keywords: de-ethnicization, hybrid war, language politics, monocentric 
languages, non-Russian Russophones, pluricentric languages, Russian language, 
Russophone states, Russo-Ukrainian war, state varieties of Russian.
Introduction
The end of history – as bravely proposed by Francis Fukuyama in 1992 in the wake of the fall of communism and the breakup of 
the Soviet Union (Fukuyama, 1992) – unfortunately came to an early and 
unexpected end in Europe in 2014 with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and 
onslaught on Ukraine, which led to the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. 
One way or another, language politics has become an important part of the 
story, politicians taking decisions on the cue of language, and legitimizing 
decisions with this proverbial ‘puff of hot air’. Ethnolinguistic nationalism 
(or the equation of a language’s entire speech community with a nation) 
was developed in Central Europe during the 19th century. Subsequently, 
it was implemented in the following century with the sudden founding of 
ethnolinguistic nation-states, especially after 1918 and 1989 (Kamusella, 
2018a, pp. 173–174). Now in the early 21st century, it seems that this 
ideology has become another weapon in resurgent Russia’s ideological 
armoury geared to the needs of newly invented hybrid warfare (cf. Wasiuta 
& Wasiuta, 2017; Yashin, 2016). This weaponization of language has 
generated much discussion on the Russian language itself, first of all, quite 
understandably, in Ukraine (cf. O’Loughlin, Toal, & Kolosov, 2016). This 
article probes into the status of Russian as seen from this perspective by 
speakers of this language, alongside politicians and scholars in the mainly 
post-Soviet states, where Russian functions as the or an official (national, 
state) language.
The discussion opens with a brief overview of the globe’s ‘big languages’, 
each of them construed as consisting of state-specific varieties. Russian is the 
sole exception to this principle of pluricentrism among the languages of this 
type. This generalized and rather unreflective insistence on the monocentric 
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character of Russian appears to be a carry-over from the former Soviet 
Union, where practically all the Russian-speakers used to live. For a quarter 
of a century, the post-Soviet states bowed to the Kremlin’s unilateral and 
never openly discussed the Kremlin’s insistence that only Russia had the 
right to control the Russian language, meaning the principles and practices 
of its standardization. The year 2014 was a sobering wake-up call, when 
Moscow firmly deployed Russian as an argument for extending pretensions 
to adjacent territories compactly inhabited by Russophone communities 
in Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, or Kazakhstan (Wasiuta, 2017). This 
was done on the basis of the assumption that each ‘native’ (L1) Russian-
speaker must be a member of the Russian nation; this assumption was 
enshrined in the hastily adopted 2014 Russian citizenship law. As a result, 
ethnolinguistic nationalism was moulded into the ideological foundation of 
Russian neo-imperialism.
However, the principle of sovereignty, as practiced consistently across 
the globe since the mass decolonization during the 1960s, does not allow 
other states to meddle in a given polity’s affairs, including language politics 
if that is of import for such a polity. That is why there are as many ‘world 
Englishes’ or ‘world Spanishes’ as there are states where these two languages 
are employed in an official capacity. Unless the founding principles of 
international relations are dramatically altered, it is high time for the 
development of autonomous ‘world Russians’ in the post-Soviet states in 
order to forestall Russian aggression. Russia’s attack on Ukraine evoked a 
heated discussion on this subject in the latter country, followed closely in 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Kazakhstan. Previously only few scholars and 
intellectuals had looked into this issue, especially when debating whether 
territorial varieties of Russian should be termed as dialects or regiolects and 
what it actually might mean. 
What is elsewhere the subject of scholarly debates in faculties of 
philology, literature and linguistics, now has become an instrument of neo-
imperial politics as conducted by Russia in the post-Soviet states. As such 
this issue of the normative monocentrism of the Russian language and its 
ramifications should be given more attention among political scientists. 
It appears that the survival of some post-Soviet states and the disarming 
of Russian neo-imperialism depend on the acceptance that numerous 
‘world Russians’ exist, and each post-Soviet state should control its own. 
Reconstruing Russian as a pluricentric language is a small price to pay for 
peace and stability from Vladivostok to Vilnius and from Arkhangelsk to 
Dushanbe, and perhaps, to Tel Aviv.
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World Languages: Decolonization,  Pluricentrism and De-Ethnicization
Rarely do scholars (let alone politicians) take note of the otherwise quite 
obvious fact that potentially (and in the socio-political reality, as observed 
nowadays) the most pluricentric of all the extant Slavic languages is Russian. 
All the globe’s ‘large’ (or ‘world’) languages are spoken and written by 
hundreds of millions in a myriad of polities. All of them are largely de-
ethnicized lingua francas of former or current empires; all these empires 
with their centres (metropolises) located exclusively in Eurasia. Russian was 
(and to a degree still is) such an imperial lingua franca. Scholars noticed and 
began researching the phenomenon of pluricentric languages at the turn of 
the 1970s. One source of inspiration was the development of state-specific 
varieties of German in the aftermath of World War II (Clyne, 1992), and 
another a reflection on the rapid rise of different ‘world Englishes’ in the wake 
of decolonization (“International Association for World Englishes”, 2018). 
Nowadays (according to the statistical figures of 2010) about 76 million 
people speak French as their first language, 92 million German, 215 
million Portuguese, 295 million Arabic, 360 million English, 405 million 
Spanish, and 955 million Chinese (that is, Mandarin, standard Chinese). 
This ranking changes quite a bit when the cited numbers combine both 
speakers who use these Einzelsprachen2 as their first languages (L1) and as 
second languages (L2). All the speakers of German as their first and second 
language (L1 and L2) amount to 129 million, of French to 229 million, of 
Portuguese also to 229 million, of Arabic to 422 million, of Spanish to 527 
million, of English to 983 million, and of Chinese to 1.09 billion. The rate 
of de-ethnicization measured by the ratio of L1 to L2 speakers is the highest 
for English and French, in the case of which L1 speakers account only for 
a third of all the speakers, and the lowest for Chinese and Portuguese with 
L1 speakers amounting to more than 90 per cent of all the speakers of these 
two Einzelsprachen.3 Russian with its 155 million L1 (native) speakers – 
2 In English it is difficult to express the semantic difference between ‘language’ as the biological 
(evolutionary) capacity for speech that does not take plural and is never preceded by an article, on 
the one hand, and ‘a language’ as a (cultural, human-constructed) actualization of this capacity, 
on the other. In the latter case this noun must be preceded by an article and enjoys a plural form. 
These both radically different meanings are denoted by the same noun ‘language’, which often 
leads to confusion. In order to cut on this ambiguity, I use the specialist German term Einzel-
sprache for a language, i.e. one of many.
3 The rate of de-ethnicization calculated as the ratio of L1 to L2 speakers is not without its 
problems. For instance, there are no native speakers of standard Arabic, meaning Arab children 
acquire this standard language at school, not in the family and community, where an unstandard-
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or 267 million L1 and L2 speakers – fits perfectly into the category of the 
world’s ‘big’ (pluricentric) languages; its L1 speakers accounting for just 
over half of all the speakers of this Slavic Einzelsprache. This high rate of 
de-ethnicization in the case of Russian is not equalled by the other (apart 
from English and French) aforementioned global languages – that is, 
Arabic, German or Spanish – with L1 speakers accounting for more than 
two-thirds of all the speakers of these Einzelsprachen. 
German is an official or national language in six states (Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Switzerland), Arabic in 27 polities, 
while English in as many as 58 countries. On the other hand, Russian is an 
official or national language in seven states (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), in five de facto states 
(Abkhazia, Donetsk People’s, Lugansk People’s Republic, South Ossetia and 
Transnistria), while considerable Russophone speech communities exist in 
six countries (Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine). What is 
more, Russian remains an important foreign (second, L2) language of wider 
communication in at least four further states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Mongolia).
Language L1 + L2 speakers L1 speakers De-ethnicization: L1 speakers  
as a percentage of all (L1 + L2) 
speakers; the smaller the 
percentage, the greater  
the de-ethnicization
Chinese 1.09 billion 955 million 90%
English 983 million 360 million 37%
ized Arabic dialect is always the medium of everyday communication (Farghaly, 2005, p. 32). 
From this perspective, one could say that the de-ethnicization rate of Arabic must be 100 per cent. 
A similar phenomenon takes place in the case of about 382 million speakers of Chinese dialects, 
who account for over 32 per cent of all the speakers of the Chinese language (Rovira Esteva, 
2010, pp. 202–203). Hence, simplistically one could propose that among people who consider 
themselves to be ethnic Chinese (Han) the de-ethnicization rate of their language stands at 32 
per cent; hence, 40 or more per cent of ethnically non-Chinese L2 speakers are taken into consid-
eration. But all these ethnically Arab and ethnically Chinese L2 learners of standard Arabic and 
standard Chinese, respectively, do not consider these standard languages as ‘foreign’ or somehow 
‘not theirs’. So for all practical reasons they are L1 (or maybe L1.5) speakers, whose number does 
not contribute to the de-ethnicization of the languages in question. Obviously, if speakers of this 
or that Arabic or Chinese dialect decided to gain full-fledged literacy only in it without bothering 
to master the prescribed standard language, then they would have to be subtracted from the totals 
of L1 speakers of these two languages. As a result, such a dialect would become an ethnic lan-
guage in its own right, which is the case of Maltese. This language is a standardized variety of the 
Maghrebi (Libyan and Tunisian) dialect of Arabic. Obviously, the Maltese do not learn standard 
Arabic as their national (ethnic, standard) language.
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Spanish 527 million 405 million 77%
Arabic 422 million 295 million 70%
Russian 267 million 155 million 58%
Portuguese 229 million 215 million 94%
French 229 million 76 million 33%
German 129 million 92 million 71%
Fig 1.  Number of speakers of the world’s pluricentric (‘big’) languages, as contrasted with 
Russian. 
Hence, Russian is widely employed in writing, speech, the mass media, 
administration, publishing and education in at least 22 polities from 
the Far East to the Middle East, and from Eastern Europe to Central 
Asia. This metrics places the language close to Arabic, and well ahead of 
German. Russian is a middling world language, in terms of its speakers, 
‘bigger’ than German but ‘smaller’ than English or Spanish, roughly on a 
par with Portuguese. However, Russian is much more de-ethnicized than 
German and Spanish, let alone Portuguese. Strangely, with the pronounced 
exception of Russian, all of the aforementioned world languages (Arabic, 
Chinese, English, German, French, Portuguese or Spanish) are construed 
as comprising somewhat differing state-specific varieties. Nowadays, 
computer users may choose their preferred (state) variety of a given world 
language from the software menu. Russian, however, is the sole world 
language that is construed as a homogenous and unitary entity, officially 
with no diverging state or ethnic varieties. The situation seems to be like 
that because Russia and other post-Soviet states concur with Moscow’s 
highly ideologized insistence that speaking Russian as a first language is the 
sure sign that a person belongs to the Russian nation, despite the fact that at 
present she or he may be a citizen of numerous other countries than Russia. 
This Moscow-led Russophone aspiration to national and linguistic unity 
and homogeneity – so typical of ethnolinguistic nation-states in Central 
Europe – is unheard of among states that employ other world languages for 
official and educational purposes.
Language Official and/or national in the following countries Number
Arabic Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,  Mauritania, 
Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Sahrawi Republic 
(Western Sahara), Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, 
Tanzania (Zanzibar), Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, 
Yemen
27
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English Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cook 
Islands, Dominica, Federated States of Micronesia, 
Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, India, Ireland, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Malta, Marshall 
Islands, Mauritius, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Nigeria, 
Niue, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, 
Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tuvalu, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Vanuatu, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe
58
German Austria, Belgium, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, 
Switzerland
6
Russian Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
7
Fig 2. Russian, and selected ‘world languages’ as states’ official or national languagesMonocentric Russian: Contradictions
After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, almost a seamless and 
rarely commented ideological transition took place between the Soviet 
(Marxist-Leninist) theory of the pending merger (zblizhenie) and eventual 
unification (sliianie) of all the Soviet peoples (nationalities) into a classless 
Soviet communist people or nation (narod), on the one hand, and the Russkii 
Mir (‘Russian World’) ideology, on the other. The proposed unification of 
the multiethnic population into a ‘post-ethnic’ Soviet people, in the former 
case, was to be achieved through the adoption of Russian as their language 
of ‘interethnic communication’ by all the Soviet peoples who then would 
become a singular unified classless Soviet communist narod (Beloded et 
al., 1976; Dzyuba, 1974; Kondakov, 1976; Kuzeev, 1971). Similarly, the 
Russkii Mir ideology proposes that all communities of (native) speakers of 
Russian (despite the different states of their residence or birth) constitute 
inalienable parts of the same borderless single and homogenous (Pan- or 
Great) Russian nation, thus making Russian the sole monocentric large 
language of ‘international communication’ (V. N. Ivanov & Sergeev, 2008, 
p. 42; Lobodanov, 2015). Tellingly, in Russian the Soviet term ‘interethnic 
communication’ is exactly the same as the Russkii Mir term ‘international 
Tomasz Kamusella
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communication’, namely, mezhnatsional’noe obshcheniie.4 The potential for 
multi-variant translations and interpretations of this concept for a variety of 
ideological purposes is heightened by the fact that in the Russian language 
the very term ‘Russian’ is expressed with two distinctive adjectives, namely 
Russkii and Rossiiskii. The former means ‘ethnically Russian and (at least in 
culture) Orthodox’, while the latter ‘Russian in the sense of being a citizen 
of Russia, despite any non-Russkii ethnic origin’ (Kamusella, 2012). The 
Russkii Mir ideology expands the latter meaning (Rossiiskii) to all Russkii 
and non-Russkii (native) Russian-speakers, living outside today’s Russia, 
especially after the 2014 Duma act that offers fast-track Russian citizenship to 
all (native) Russian-speakers (“Gosduma”, 2014). In Russian such a (native) 
Russian-speaker is often denoted with the collocation russkoiazychny 
sootechestvennik, literally ‘Russian-speaking compatriot’. In the current legal 
sense, as employed in the Russian Federation, the term sootechestvennik 
(‘compatriot’) means ‘all former Soviet citizens and their descendants’. 
Importantly, with the removal of the term ‘Soviet’ (Sovietskii) from present-
day Russian law, it was firmly replaced with the adjective Rossiisskii, rather 
than Russkii (“Sootechestvenniki”, 2017).
Soviet term Post-1991 Russian term
English translation
natsiia nation {group of people; not a state}
natsionalnost’ {the state of an ethnic group, belonging to nation}
nationality {the state 
of belonging 
to a nation [i.e. group 
of people, not state]; {not 
citizenship}], 
4 The semantic fields of the Russian terms narod (‘people’) and natsia (‘nation’) are fur-
ther blurred by derived collocations, names of organizations and concepts of political sci-
ence. The United Nations Organization is literally translated into Russian as the Organizatsiia 
Ob’’edinenykh Natsii. However, the collocation ‘international relations’ is denoted in Russian 
as mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia. Both English collocations share the same term ‘nation’ as a 
synonym for the word ‘state’. Although in the Russian counterparts also ‘state’ is intended, this 
meaning is variously denoted by two different words natsiia and narod, which in common us-
age denote ‘nation’ (i.e. a group of people united by a shared language) or ‘people’, never ‘state.’ 
The compound noun mezhgosudarstvennyi (‘interstate’) with the word gosudarstvo (‘state’) 
featuring in it is rare, appearing in the collocation mezhgosudarstvennyia organizatsiia (‘inter-
national organization’), though usually the term mezhdunarodnyia organizatsiia is preferred.
 Terminological confusion or polyvalence is quite useful for conferring a veneer of ideological 
coherence onto the necessarily mixed bag of (neo-)imperial policies that apply different stan-
dards and seek different outcomes in the case of similar groups of population (nations, ethnic 
groups, or nationalities), especially if such groups in question live in distant corners of a geo-
graphically vast empire and of its sphere of influence.
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{developed, 
meaning 
‘industrialized, 
bourgeois’ 
ethnic group / 
nation in the 
SU} 
increasingly 
synonymous with 
narodnost’, meaning 
an ethnic group 
or nation {with no 
right to statehood}
nationality {ethnic group 
[not nation] with no right to 
statehood}
increasingly 
‘citizenship’ by 
parallel with the 
English use of 
‘nationality’
nationality in the meaning of 
citizenship
mezhnatsional’ny
interethnic {between ethnic 
groups}, Soviet period;
international {between states, 
including post-Soviet states}, 
after 1991
Organizatsiia Ob’’edinenykh Natsii United Nations {an organization of states}
Narod
nation {group of people, 
not state}
a people
narodnost’
ethnic group, nation {with no 
right to statehood}
nationality {group of people 
[not nation] with no right to 
statehood}
{underdeveloped, 
meaning 
‘agricultural, 
feudal’ ethnic 
group / nation 
in the SU}
mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia
international relations 
{between 
states}
Russkii {ethnic Russians, i.e. [culturally] Orthodox 
Slavophones}
Russian
Rossiiskii = Sovietskii [Soviet] 
{all Soviet citizens, despite their 
different ethnic [linguistic, 
confessional, racial and other] 
origin}
Rossiiskii = 
russkoiazychny 
sootechestvennik 
[Russian-speaking 
compatriot]  
{all native 
Russian-speakers, 
former Soviet 
citizens and their 
descendants in all 
the post-Soviet 
states and Israel}
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Gosudarstvo state
Grazhdanstvo
citizenship [in English usually 
expressed by 
the term ‘nationality’]
Fig 3. Comparison of the semantic fields of selected Soviet, Russian and English political terms.Linguistic Monocentrism in the Service of Russian  Neo-Imperialism?
In the context of Russia’s continuing ideological and military attack on 
Ukraine since 2014, it is important to remember that the discussion on 
the dichotomy of Russkii and Rossiiskii is not an internal Russian matter.5 
The adjective Russkii is derived from the adjectival form of the name of 
the medieval polity of Rus’, nowadays usually known under the scholarly 
name of Kyivan Rus’, because its capital was located in Kyiv. At present 
this city serves as the capital of Ukraine. In Greek, which was the official 
language of the (East) Roman (‘Byzantine’) Empire, Rus’ was known as 
Ros. Because Constantinople was then the centre of the Orthodox Christian 
world, Greek was seen as the language of the highest cultural and political 
prestige in Orthodox Muscovy. When in 1547 the Grand Duke of Muscovy 
adopted the title of tsar (‘king’ or ‘emperor’), the polity’s name was changed 
to Rosia in official (Church) Slavonic, in line with the prestigious Greek 
usage. Meanwhile, the original term Rus’ (or Ruś in Polish) was used to refer 
to the western half of the original Rus’ lands that found themselves in the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Likewise, the vernacular Slavic official 
language of the Commonwealth’s Grand Duchy of Lithuania (in four-fifths 
composed of the Rus’ lands) was named Ruski (Ruthenian in English, as 
filtered through Latin; cf. Cigogna, 1606, p. 435) in this language and Polish, 
and later also Rus’ki(i) in Ruthenian. This linguonym was derived directly 
from the name of Rus’. In 1721, Peter the Great changed his realm’s name 
to Rossiiskaia Imperiia. In this collocation the Greek in its origin Slavic term 
Rosia for Rus’ was paired with the Latin (Western European) word Imperium 
for ‘empire’, rendered in Cyrillic-based Slavic transcription as Imperiia. 
When the codification of the Russian language on the Western European 
model commenced in the 18th century with an eye to removing (Church) 
Slavonic from official use in the state administration, this language became 
known as Rossiiskii in Russian; this linguonym derived from the state’s name 
5 I thank Professor Leonid Zashkilnyak, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, for a timely re-
minder on the importance of this issue for the discussion of state-specific varieties of the Russian 
language.
RUSSIAN: A MONOCENTRIC OR PLURICENTRIC LANGUAGE?
163COLLOQUIA HUMANISTICA
of Rossiia. In the Rus’ lands in Poland-Lithuania, the employment of the 
terms Rus’ and Rus’kii in Ruthenian and Ruś and Ruski in Polish continued. 
After the partitions of Poland-Lithuania in the late 18th century, both terms 
were preserved in the Rus’ lands that found themselves in the Austrian and 
Russian partition zones. However, in the latter partition zone, following 
the 1830-1831 uprising of the Polish-Lithuanian nobility against the tsar, 
Polish was replaced with Russian as the region’s official language during the 
latter half of the 1830s. Ostensibly, the law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
was employed to justify this decision, because the polity’s 16th-century 
code of law, namely the Lithuanian Statute, specified Rus’kii as the Grand 
Duchy’s official language. Furthermore, in official Russian administrative 
practice the Russian name of the Russian language was gradually changed 
between the mid-1830s and mid-1840s from Rossiiskii to Russkii in order 
to emphasize the ideologically sought equation between the Grand Duchy’s 
then still prestigious Ruthenian language and Russia’s upcoming Rossiiskii 
language. The subsequent conflation of the linguonym Rus’kii with Rossiiskii, 
yielded the form Russkii as the Russian name of the Russian language, i.e. the 
palatalization [‘] was dropped and the [s] in Rus’kii was doubled in line with 
Russian phonemic and spelling patterns. As a result, the correspondence 
between the name of the state and its language was decisively decoupled. To 
this day Russia remains Rossiia in Russian, but the name of the country’s 
official language is Russkii. On the other hand, within the boundaries of 
the Russian Empire the speech of Ruthenian-speakers in what today is 
Belarus and central and eastern Ukraine became known in official Russian 
terminology as ‘dialects’ (narecha). The nareche of the area corresponding 
to present-day Belarus was dubbed Belorusskii (‘White Russian’), and that of 
Russia’s Ukrainian lands as Maloros(s)iis’kii, Maloru(s)s’kii (‘Little Russian’), 
or even Ros(s)iis’kii. In reciprocation Belarusian-speaking national activists 
sometimes referred to the Russian language as Maskal’ska (Muscovian), 
while their Ukrainian counterparts as Moskovs’ka (Muscovian). In today’s 
Belarusian, Russian is known as Raseiskaia, and as Rosiis’ka in present-
day Ukrainian. Hence, in the wake of the change of the Russian name of 
the Russian language from Rossiiskii to Russkii, the former linguonym 
was partly adopted for referring to (Little) Ruthenian (today’s Ukrainian) 
within the Russian Empire, while Ruthenian-speakers and their present-day 
descendants (that is, Belarusian- and Ukrainian-speakers) have consistently 
continued to refer to Russian with the linguonym Rossiiskii, as modified in 
line with the phonemic and spelling standards of Belarusian and Ukrainian. 
The same is true of former Poland-Lithuania’s main official language, Polish, 
in which Russian was known as Rossyjski(j) in the 19th century, before the 
modern term Rosyjski was codified. The Rossiiskii-based correspondence 
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between the names of Russia and the Russian language is maintained in 
Belarusian, Polish and Ukrainian, the country being known, respectively, 
as Raseia, Rosja and Rosiia. Hence, in the cultural memory preserved in 
the Slavic Einzelsprachen of former Poland-Lithuania the name of Russia 
and its official language are still Rossiia and Rossiiskii, while the terms Rus’ 
and Rus’an (Ruski) are reserved for medieval Rus’ and former Poland-
Lithuania’s Rus’ lands, nowadays located mostly in Belarus, eastern Poland 
and Ukraine. At the turn of the 20th century Ukrainian national activists 
adopted the novel name of ‘Ukrainian’ (Ukrains’ka in Ukrainian) in order 
to clearly distinguish it at the terminological level from Russian.6 Another 
reason for this change was that in Austria-Hungary’s Galicia Ukrainian 
was officially known as (Little) Ruthenian (Ruthenisch in German, Ruski 
or Rusiński in Polish, and Rus(‘)ki(i) in Ukrainian) and as Little Russian 
(Malorossiis’kii) in Russia, so the single linguonym of Ukrainian as designed 
for both varieties usefully emphasized that the variously named Ukrainian 
language was (to be) a single national Einzelsprache of the Ukrainian nation-
in-making. The choice of the name of Ukrainian was set in stone in the 
Soviet Union, where full correspondence was introduced between the name 
of the language (Ukrainian), the nation (Ukrainians) and their homeland 
(Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic). The now obsolete ethnonym Rusini 
for the Ukrainians and Rusiński for their language survived in interwar 
Poland against the Ukrainians’ heartfelt wishes. Warsaw used these names, 
first of all, for differentiating Ukrainians living in Poland from those in the 
Soviet Union, and also for the sake of forced Polonization of the country’s 
largest minority of five million. Nowadays, when the Russo-Ukrainian war 
continues, it is not uncommon to hear an opinion in Ukraine that the rulers 
of Russia (Rossiia) unilaterally appropriated the name Russkii for denoting 
their country’s language and nation (both formerly known as Rossiiskii), 
though originally this ethnonym and linguonym had been the name of the 
6 This change commenced in the mid-1870s in Austria-Hungary’s Galicia. Publishers and histo-
rians (importantly Volodymyr Anronovych and Mykhailo Hrushevsky) began to use the double-
barrelled adjective Ukrainian-Rus’an (Ukrains’ko-Rus’kyi) in opposition to the Russian imperial term 
‘Great Russian’ in order to stress the ethnolinguistic separateness of Ruthenians/Little Russians vis-à-
vis the Velikorusskii (Great Russians). The traditional ethno-adjective (i.e. linguonym or ethnonym) 
Rus’kyi, often rendered as Russkii in Russian spelling, was insufficient, because to most it suggested 
the ethnolinguistic sameness of the Ukrainians and the Russians, given the aforementioned 1830s 
change in the Russian name of the Russian language from Rossiiskii to Russkii. Rus’ko-Ukrainskyi was 
an alternative rendering of this double-barrelled neologism. Slavists in Austria-Hungary began to use 
the linguonym ‘Ukrainian’ in preference to Little Russian or Ruthenian already in 1915. Finally, with 
the founding of Ukraine as a state in 1917, this double-barrelled ethno-adjective was firmly replaced 
with the single term ‘Ukrainian’ for denoting the Ukrainian language, nation and state in line with 
the normative isomorphic principle of Central Europe’s ethnolinguistic nationalism (Farion, 2015, 
pp. 217–218; Halushko, 2016, pp. 16–17; Wendland, 2011, p. 412).
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Ukrainians (Rusini) and their language (Ruski) (Farion, 2015, pp. 185–200, 
210–216; “Historyia”, 2018; Kamusella, 2009, p. 177, 2012; “Nastoiashchiĭ 
russkiĭ”, 2012; “Nazva”, 2018). 
9th-14th cc Rus’
Linguonyms Rus’an in Slavic Ros in Greek
14th-18th cc Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Poland-
Lithuania
Muscovy / Rosia (from 
1574) / Rossiiskaia 
Imperiia (from 1721)
Linguonyms Rus(’)ki(i) in Ruthenian, 
Ruski in Polish
Rossiiskii in Russian
1795-mid-
1830s
Galicia, Austrian 
Empire
Rossiiskaia Imperiia
Russian 
Partition 
zone
Muscovian lands  
Linguonyms
Ruthenisch in German
Rus(’)ki(i) in 
Ruthenian, 
Ruski  
in Polish
Rossiiskii in Russian,  
Rossyjski(j) in Polish
1840s-1860s Maloros(s)
iis’kii, 
Maloru(s)s’kii, 
Ros(s)iis’kii  
in Russian
Russkii and Velikorusskii 
(Great Russian) in Russian1870s-1914 Ruthenisch in German, 
Ruski or Rusiński  
in Polish, Rus(’)ki(i)  
in Ukrainian
Great War Galicia, Austrian 
Empire / Ukraine
Austro-
Hungarian 
and German 
occupation / 
Ukraine
Rossiiskaia Imperiia 
/ Russian Republic 
(Rossiiskaia Respublika) / 
Bolshevik Russia (Rossiia)
Linguonyms Ukrainian (Ukrains’ka in Ukrainian; 
mostly & increasingly)
Russkii in Russian, 
Maskal’ska in Belarusian, 
Rosyjski in Polish, 
Moskovs’ka in Ukrainian
1922-1939 Poland Soviet Union
Ukrainian 
SSR
Linguonyms Rusiński in Polish Ukrainian 
(Ukrains’ka) Russkii in Russian 
(Raseiskaia in Belarusian, 
Rosiis’ka in Ukrainian)World War II
German occupation
Linguonyms Ukrainian (Ukrains’ka)
Russian 
Partition zone
Rossii kai  Imperiia
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1945-1991 Soviet Union
Ukrainian SSR
Linguonyms Ukrainian (Ukrains’ka) Russkii in Russian 
(Raseiskaia in 
Belarusian, 
Rosiis’ka in Ukrainian)
1991-today Ukraine Russian Federation
Linguonyms Ukrainian (Ukrains’ka in Ukrainian, 
Ukraiński in Polish, 
Ukrainskii in Russian)
Russkii in Russian
Fig 4.  Linguonym Rus(s)ki(i) and Rossiiskii between Rus’, Poland-Lithuania, Muscovy, Russian 
Empire, Austria-Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union, Ukraine and the Russian Federation 
(thus far).
The entailed tacit threat of a steel fist of hard military power (i.e. the 
Russian army and Russia’s 1990s ‘hard’ geopolitical concept of ‘near 
abroad’) in the kid glove of the soft power of culture (as embodied by 
the Russkii Mir ideology) is that the Kremlin reserves for itself the right 
of intervention in areas and states where large Russophone communities 
exist, should a ‘host country’ act, from Moscow’s perspective, against the 
interests of such a community or of Russia itself. These Russian-speaking 
communities are construed as inalienable parts of the single and indivisible 
speech community of the Russian language, nowadays defined as the 
Russian nation in light of the neo-imperial and ethnolinguistic ideology 
of Russkii Mir that builds on the earlier post-Soviet concept of Russia’s 
‘near abroad’ (Il’inskiĭ, 2010, p. 36). All the members of the Russian speech 
community are imagined as speaking the very same monocentric (unitary) 
Russian language, despite living in different states with their specific and 
often vastly different social, political, economic, ethnic, linguistic and other 
realities of everyday life. For now this thinly veiled threat – cloaked in the 
veneer of the presumed soft power of the Russkii Mir ideology – works 
rather well at keeping the cultural, linguistic, social and economic unity 
of the Kremlin-postulated ‘Russian World’ (Russkii Mir) with Russia 
as its cultural, political, economic and decisional centre. The sharp edge 
of this threat is either sweetened with cheap oil and gas (as in the case of 
Belarus), or put to work when Russian troops are dispatched to attack a 
‘misbehaving’ country, be it Moldova in 1992, Georgia in 2008, or currently 
Ukraine. From the perspective of the Russkii Mir ideology such countries 
may appear to be ‘stranded’ or ‘unjustifiably secessionist’ regions of ‘real 
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Russia’, equated with the Soviet Union or even with the Russian Empire (cf. 
Baburin, 2013; Panteleev, 2008; “Putin”, 2005).
Official / national 
language
Official / national 
language in de 
facto states
States with 
considerable 
Russophone 
speech communities
Language 
of wider 
communication
Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Russian, 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan
[7]
Abkhazia, Donetsk 
People’s Republic, 
Lugansk People’s 
Republic, 
South Ossetia, 
Transnistria
[5]
Estonia, 
Israel, 
Latvia, 
Lithuania, 
Moldova, 
Ukraine
[6]
Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, 
Georgia,  
Mongolia
[4]
Fig 5.  Use of Russian worldwide (italicization denotes states that were never part of the Soviet 
Union).
For better or worse, Russian is construed as a monocentric language, with 
the Russian Academy of Sciences in the Russian capital of Moscow as the 
language’s sole controlling institution. This insistence on the monocentric 
(unitary) character of Russian is a direct legacy of Central Europe’s 
ethnolinguistic nationalism which equates languages with nations and 
states (i.e. the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state). To a 
degree, this ideology only appears to stand at variance with the present-day 
Russian Federation’s neo-imperial programme. But in reality the Kremlin’s 
concept of the ‘Russian World’ has quite successfully married Moscow’s 
territorial ambitions of regaining some parts of the Soviet Union that – 
in Moscow’s view – post-Soviet Russia lost ‘unjustifiably’ (for instance, 
Crimea or Transnistria) with the idea of an ethnolinguistically defined 
Russian nation, which is spatially bigger than the territory of the present-
day Russian Federation. And the Russian nation re-imagined in such a 
manner keeps ‘growing’ in spatial terms, so that a ‘big chunk’ of it now 
resides in Israel, potentially giving the Kremlin an ‘ideologically justified’ 
foothold in the Middle East.
Interestingly, not much attention seems to be paid – either in Russia 
or elsewhere – to the fact that this recent push for the ethnolinguistic 
definition of the Russian nation within the framework of the ideology of the 
‘Russian World’ may be harmful to the social cohesion and eventually to the 
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation itself (cf. Marusenko, 2015, 
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pp. 154–170). In the country’s autonomous republics at least 26 languages 
are employed in an official capacity (Abaza, Adyghe, Altai, Bashkir, Buryat, 
Chechen, Cherkess, Chuvash, Crimean Tatar, Erzya, Ingush, Kabardian, 
Kalmyk, Karachay-Balkar, Khakas, Komi, Hill Mari, Meadow Mari, Moksha, 
Nogai, Ossetic, Tatar, Tuvan, Udmurt, Ukrainian and Yakut) (“Languages 
of Russia”, 2017). This fact is rarely commented, because the multiplicity of 
Russia’s official languages is given a semblance of scriptural homogeneity 
following the Duma’s 2002 decision that all of Russia’s official languages 
native to the country’s territory must be written in Cyrillic (Faller, 2011, 
pp. 132–133). In turn, this script is popularly construed as the ‘Russian 
alphabet’ and often equated with the Russian language itself (Ponomareva, 
2002), Russia, and nowadays, with the ‘Russian world’ (cf. Bukarskiĭ, 2016, 
p. 610). However, from the perspective of ethnolinguistic nationalism, 
each of these aforementioned 26 speech communities may potentially 
leave the Rossiiskii cultural-cum-political commonality, redefine itself 
as an independent nation, and even demand full independence for their 
republic, thus recast as an indipendent nation-state (cf. Marusenko, 2015, 
pp. 171–201). Actually, that was exactly what the Chechens did during the 
1990s. In reply to the Chechens’ demand of national self-determination for 
their nation and of independence for their national republic, the Kremlin 
visited on them the two horrific Russo-Chechen wars (1994-1996, 1999-
2000). This military conflict seriously destabilized Russia and its economy, 
and cost the lives of a fifth of Chechnya’s population. It was a clear act of 
genocide that after 2001 was conveniently forgotten by the international 
community when Russia joined Washington’s campaign of ‘global war on 
terror’ (Abumuslimov, 1995; Gilligan, 2010; Zherebtsova, 2014). 
World Russians?
When different countries use the same language of worldwide 
communication they do not see their populations as constituting a single 
nation. Usually, it is the political boundaries of the states, their histories 
and the desires of their specific bodies politic that decide what a nation is 
or should be, not the mere accident of a language. When the same word in 
states sharing a single language is pronounced or spelled differently, this 
fact does not constitute any political or ideological scandal, and such an 
occurrence may not amount to a reason for diplomatic, let alone military 
intervention, unlike in the case of ethnolinguistic nation-states. The 
descriptive principle of usage-based correctness is not applied at the level 
of the entire language (which again, on the contrary, is the very case of 
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Central Europe’s monocentric languages run in a prescriptive manner in 
the region’s ethnolinguistically defined and legitimized nation-states), but 
on the plane of the use which is typical for the speakers of the language in 
question in a given state (that is, one of many). A language of this type is 
pluricentric, i.e. with many centres of use, identified with different states 
where this language is employed in an official capacity. A specific spelling 
or pronunciation may be correct in country A, but incorrect in country B, 
or just second best in country C (Clyne, 1992; Clyne & Kipp, 1999; Muhr, 
2016a, 2016b; Muhr & Marley, 2015).
Arabic, English or German are such pluricentric languages. ‘Theater’ 
is correct in US (‘American’) English, but incorrect in British English, 
where the word is spelled ‘theatre’. ‘Wee’ is a Scotticism in England’s 
English, but a typical synonym for the adjective ‘small’ in Scottish English. 
‘You’ is the singular second person and plural second person pronoun in 
British English, but only the former in Irish English, whereas the latter 
meaning is expressed in Irish English with the separate word of ‘yous’. 
When a pluricentric language is shared by many countries, it means that 
such a language becomes de-ethnicized; it ceases being a marker of one’s 
belonging to a nation or being a citizen of state X. Atypically, Russian is 
the only ‘big’ language of worldwide communication shared by numerous 
countries which (as yet?) is considered not to be pluricentric or de-
ethnicized. But having recognized the sociolinguistic dynamics of this 
plural reality of ‘world Russians’ on the ground, it is possible to reimagine 
monocentric Russian as a pluricentric language. It is no news with regard 
to the English language that continues to exist as a single Einzelsprache, 
despite the widely accepted and well-established acknowledgement of 
the existence of ‘world Englishes’ in the plural (cf. Hopkins, Decker, & 
McKenny, 2013).
On the ideological grounds of the Russkii Mir ideology, Moscow may 
disagree to such a change in the perception of the Russian language, 
but in this modern world of sovereign nation-states, Russia’s consent 
in this regard is not of essence. Countries where Russian is employed 
for official purposes or where substantial Russophone communities 
live, may unilaterally recognize the territorial and cultural specificity of 
the countries’ respective Russians, i.e. Russian languages in the plural. 
Nowadays in computer menus one can select from many state-specific 
varieties of English as an input language. The same is also true of Arabic or 
German. But obviously not so in the case of the Russian language, which 
features in these menus as a single option with no state-specific variants 
available.
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Fig 6.  Screenshot with a computer menu indicating different country-specific Englishes as input 
languages.
Fig 7.  Screenshot with a computer menu indicating that Russian is treated as a single monocentric 
input language with no country-specific variants.
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Computers, software and computer menus are human-made, products 
of human will and ingenuity, like nations, states and languages themselves. 
None of these above enumerated artefacts exist in nature, i.e. independently 
of human will. Thus, should people and governments in the countries 
where Russian is employed for official and other purposes decide so, they 
may compile dictionaries and grammars of their own state-specific Russian 
languages, be it Abkhazian Russian, Belarusian Russian, Estonian Russian, 
Kyrgyzstani Russian, Lithuanian Russian, Mongolian Russian, Turkmen 
Russian, or Ukrainian Russian. The difference vis-à-vis Russia’s Russian 
does not need to be substantial. At best it should reflect the actual difference 
in usage that exists among the states where Russian is either widespread 
in everyday communication or employed in official use. Typically, this 
difference can be anything between 20 and 100 to 300 odd words and phrases 
pertaining to the institutional and cultural specificity of a given state, which 
is the case, for example, of Austrian or Swiss German when contrasted with 
Germany’s German. Certainly, should such a need arise the difference may 
be acknowledged (cherished) more emphatically or even actively deepened 
by extending it to pronunciation, spelling or syntax as, for example, in the 
case of Indian English vis-à-vis American English. The decision, however, 
should belong solely to the population concerned in a given country 
where Russian is of import, not to Russia. London never leans on Delhi or 
Washington that in Indian English or US English they ought to accept this 
or that ‘correct’ spelling of a word, as employed in British English (Rusiecki, 
1994). Such an intervention would be at best laughed at, but not so in the 
case of Russian, where in this age of the flourishing Russkii Mir ideology, 
Moscow may choose to address a ‘politically significant linguistic matter’ of 
this kind by exerting political or even economic pressure on a ‘culprit state’ 
guilty of ‘ruining our Russian language’.
Should Abkhazian Russian, Belarusian Russian, Estonian Russian, 
Kyrgyzstani Russian, Lithuanian Russian, Mongolian Russian, Turkmen 
Russian, or Ukrainian Russian be seriously considered and introduced 
into educational and administrative use, alongside books and newspapers, 
certainly computer and software providers would swiftly reply in kind, in 
spite of any reservations that Moscow might raise in this regard. Dropdown 
menus with country-specific Russians would materialize in no time, for 
instance:
- Russian (Armenia)
- Russian (Azerbaijan)
- Russian (Belarus)
- Russian (Estonia)
- Russian (Finland)
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- Russian (Georgia)
- Russian (Israel)
- Russian (Kazakhstan)
- Russian (Kyrgyzstan)
- Russian (Latvia)
- Russian (Lithuania)
- Russian (Lithuania)
- Russian (Moldova)
- Russian (Mongolia)
- Russian (Russian Federation)
- Russian (Turkmenistan)
- Russian (Ukraine)
- Russian (Uzbekistan)
And why not? Some would say ‘impossible’, because neither Russia nor 
Russophones outside the Russian Federation want such a development. 
But don’t they, or maybe it is the over-advertised neo-imperial Russkii 
Mir discourse on the monolithic unity and homogeneity of Russian 
language, culture, statehood, geopolitics or even ‘destiny’ that effectively 
overshadows a vibrant discussion on world Russians that has developed 
since the turn of the 1980s?Between Dialect and State Variety
In the Soviet Union the discussion on the use of Russian quite clearly 
distinguished two lines of research on the language’s areal differentiation. 
The traditional one focused on the dialects of the Russian language seen 
as coterminous with the historical ethnolinguistic territory of the (Great) 
Russian (i.e. Russkii) nation, extending from Pskov and Smolensk in the west 
(or Russia’s present-day western frontier with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Belarus) to Nizhny Novgorod and Voronezh in the east (or the former 
boundary between Rus’ and the Golden Horde), and from Karelia in the 
north (or the former northernmost reaches of the Novgorod Republic) to 
Belgorod in the south (or today’s Russian-Ukrainian border). Importantly, 
the region of St Petersburg is not included in the traditional territory of the 
Russian dialects, because Muscovy only seized this Ugro-Finnic-speaking 
region of Ingria from Sweden at the turn of the 18th century. St Petersburg 
began to be built there in 1703, and nine years later the Muscovian (Russian) 
capital was moved to this new city on the Baltic littoral (Avanesov & Orlova, 
1964; “Map”, 1964/2018). In the Soviet thinking on Russian, Ingria and 
other parts of the former Russian Empire were seen through the prism of 
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the discipline of philology7 (linguistics) as areas where Russian language was 
brought during the modern period, in the course of the imperial extension 
from the aforementioned traditional (Russkii) area of the Russian dialects. 
Hence, new imperial and post-imperial forms of Russian in this imperial-
cum-Soviet-cum-post-Soviet space are seen more as ‘territorial variants’ 
(territorial’nyi variant) – i.e. varieties – of the language than its dialects. In 
contrast to the Russkii area of the Russian dialects, the imperial space of the 
Russian territorial variants is seen as Rossiiskii in its character. The imperial 
venture gradually detached the Russian language from its traditional 
Russkii ethnocultural territorial core, associated with Muscovy’s Orthodox 
Slavophone population, and imposed it on ethnically and religiously 
diversified population(s) of the Rossiiskii empire. In a nutshell, that was 
the way in which Russian was de-ethnicized and became a large language 
of international communication. The building of the Russian Empire also 
impacted on the change in the very Russian name of the Russian language. 
It was known as Rossiiskii until the 1830s, and afterward it was changed to 
Russkii. However, until the Bolshevik Revolution the imperial character 
of the Russian language was emphasized by the official term Velikorusskii 
(‘Great Russian’) language. In addition, this concept retroactively extended 
the traditional dialectal area of the (Great) Russian language to Belarus 
and Ukraine, or the former lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (i.e. the 
eastern half of Poland-Lithuania), erased from the political map of Europe 
in the late 18th century, jointly by Russia, Prussia and the Habsburgs 
(“Dialektologicheskaia karta”, 1914; Kamusella, 2012; Symaniec, 2012)
Research on the Rossiisskii (or then synonymously known as ‘Soviet’) 
territorial varieties of the Russian language began already in the Soviet Union 
7 In ethnolinguistic nation-states the term ‘philology’ is often preferred to the expression ‘linguis-
tics’ in popular and even scholarly use. In other countries the word ‘philology’ is seen as somewhat 
obsolete and ‘pre-scientific’. For instance, in English since the 1920s the term ‘linguist’ is decisively 
more often employed than ‘philologist’ for denoting a person researching language (“Use of the 
term ‘philologist’”, 2018). However, in German the term Philologe (‘philologist’) decisively domi-
nated over Sprachwissenschaftler (‘linguist’) until the mid-1970s, and since then a stable parity 
between both terms has been reached with only a slight dominance of the latter (“Use of the term 
Philologe”, 2018). In Russian, the term filolog (‘philologist’) has consistently dominated over lingvist 
(‘linguist’) during the last two centuries. A parity between these two terms with a somewhat di-
minished domination of the term filolog was achieved during the Soviet period (1920s-1980s). 
However, since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 the term filolog has been used twice more 
frequently than its counterpart lingvist, which is a clear sign of the growing ideological dominance 
of ethnolinguistic nationalism in today’s Russia (“Use of the term filolog”, 2018).
 Ethnolinguistic nationalists express their loyalty to their nation through the ‘love of their na-
tional language’ (cf Dynak, 1994, p. 42). This sentiment merges perfectly with the literal meaning 
of the Greek term philology, or ‘love of word(s)’. Obviously, the term’s ‘word(s)’ may be interpreted 
as ‘reason’, ‘scholarship’ or ‘scholarly discipline’, but also as ‘love of language’. Unsurprisingly,  the 
last reading is preferred by proponents of ethnolinguistic nationalism (cf. “Instytut”, 2018).
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(V. V. Ivanov, 1980). Impetus came from among Soviet scholars who probed 
into the areal (territorial) differentiation of French and German as employed 
in numerous states. At the turn of the 1990s (post-)Soviet researchers also 
transplanted the German term Regiolekt (‘regiolect’, ‘regional lect’, or ‘regional 
language’ that is synonymous with the German term Regionalsprache) 
into Russian academese as regiolekt (“Regiolekt”, 2018; Turbinskiĭ, 1992). 
The new Russian neologism regiolekt is employed as a synonym for the 
aforementioned Russian term variant (“Regional’nye varianty”, 2018). When 
the Soviet Union split, and its former union republics became nation-states in 
their own right, more often than not copying the Central European model of 
ethnolinguistic national polity, some proposed that it was high time to speak 
of ‘national varieties’ of the Russian language (Rudiakov, 2010; Zhuravleva, 
2005), including their codification and standardization for official use in the 
post-Soviet states (cf. Korngauz, 2013, p. 10). However, other scholars deny 
this possibility or necessity, claiming that so far no Russophone population 
living outside Russia has evolved into an ethnolinguistically defined nation 
that would be (ethnically or otherwise) separate from the Russian nation 
(Stepanov, 2010). This strain of the discourse also dates back to the Soviet 
period, when the possibility of other state (national) varieties of the Russian 
language was a priori denied in favour of the ‘imminent coalescence’ (sliianie) 
of all the Soviet peoples (narody) into a single and unified Soviet communist 
classless nation or people (narod) (Mikhailov, 1988, p. 47). Hence, especially 
in the Russian Federation during this current age of the Russkii Mir ideology, 
the old Soviet normative opinion is still rife that there may be only one single 
and always unified monocentric variety of the Russian language, namely the 
Russian one: Russia’s Russian. Many believe that maintaining the monocentric 
unity of the Russian language – so that it continues to consist of a single variant 
only – is seen as a geopolitical necessity by present-day Russia’s political and 
intellectual elite (Rudiakov, 2010, pp. 51, 70), including President Vladimir 
Putin (“Putin”, 2016). The Russkii Mir Foundation is strongly opposed to 
acknowledging (let alone recognizing) different state varieties of the Russian 
language (Serov, 2017). Such varieties are deemed to be mainly a symptom 
of the insufficient command of this language or a lack of appropriate care 
and correctness in usage, which must be ameliorated by improved education 
(“Lekant”, 2015). Others present a more objective approach to the subject, 
proposing that it will be the users and states concerned who will decide in 
the future whether varieties of Russian should be seen as regional (territorial) 
or national (state-specific). The latter case is bound to necessitate official 
recognition and a given state’s support for such a variety, while in the former 
case any emerging difference would not be recognized (let alone encouraged) 
in any formal manner (Terkulov, 2012).
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Without much acknowledgement of the fact, the previous imperial 
discussion on the historical dialects and territorial varieties of the Great 
Russian language seems to underpin the current discourse on the national 
varieties of Russian. Hence, in the Russian Federation and among pro-
Russian scholars there is much normative opposition to recognizing as 
national the state varieties of Russian in the ‘traditional dialect area’ of 
Great Russian, namely the Belarusian, Estonian, Finnish, Kazakhstani, 
Latvian, Lithuanian, Moldovan and Ukrainian varieties of Russian. At the 
other end of the spectrum one finds territorial varieties of Russian within 
Russia but outside the country’s historical dialectal area of this language, i.e. 
in Siberia and the Far East. In literature one can come across information 
on the Russian varieties of Siberia, the Far East and ‘Northern Russia’ 
(meaning Russia’s section of Karelia), or of such cities as Ekaterinburg, 
Kursk, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Perm, Rostov, Saratov, St 
Petersburg, or Vologda (cf. Bukrinskaia & Karamakova, 2012; Oglezneva, 
2008; “Regional’nye varianty”, 2018). Yet little attention is paid to varieties 
of Russian within the Russian Federation, let alone to the clear possibility 
that with time each of the country’s current 22 autonomous republics could 
create and encourage their own specific ethnic (republican or even national) 
varieties of Russian (“Republics”, 2018).
National varieties 
within the dialectal 
core of Great 
Russian
National varieties 
outside the dialectal 
core of Great Russian
Ethnic (potentially 
national) varieties in 
Russia’s autonomous 
republics
Territorial 
(non-ethnic, 
regional) 
varieties in 
Russia, outside 
the historical 
dialectal core of 
Great Russian
Belarusian 
& Trasianka, 
Estonian, 
Finnish, Kazakh 
(Kazakhstani), 
Latvian, 
Lithuanian, 
Moldovan, 
Russian, Ukrainian 
& Surzhyk
[10]
Armenian, Azeri 
(Azerbaijani), 
Georgian, 
Israeli, Kyrgyz 
(Kyrgyzstani), 
Russian, Tajik 
(Tajikistani), Uzbek 
(Uzbekistani)
[8]
Adygea, Altai, 
Bashkortostan, 
Buryatia, Chechnya, 
Chuvashia, Crimea,8 
Dagestan, Ingushetia, 
Kabardino-Balkaria, 
Kalmykia, Karachay–
Cherkessia, Karelia, 
Khakassia, Komi, Mari 
El, Mordovia, North 
Ossetia–Alania, Sakha,  
Tatarstan, Tuva, 
Udmurtia
[22]
Ekaterinburg, 
Far Eastern, 
Kursk, Moscow, 
Nizhny 
Novgorod, 
Northern 
Russian, 
Novosibirsk, 
Perm, Rostov, 
Saratov, 
Siberian, St 
Petersburg, or 
Vologda
[13 & counting]
Fig 8. Potential state-specific, territorial and ethnic varieties of Russian as a pluricentric language.
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8Nowadays, the discussion on the varieties of Russian – for better or 
worse – focuses on the possibility of the existence of the language’s state-
specific variants, namely in the post-Soviet states. Willy-nilly the developing 
discourse unfolds in conjunction or in opposition to the Russkii Mir 
ideology. As mentioned above, this ideology denies any state-specific 
varieties of Russian, sticking to the monocentric norm of the unitary 
Russian language. Scholars and some politicians outside Russia for one 
reason or another are more ready to acknowledge and even espouse the 
reality of state-specific differences in the use of Russian. The discussion is 
quite intensive on ‘Belarusian Russian’ (Dem’ianovich, 2014; Norman, 2010; 
Sloboda, 2009, p. 22; Zhvalevskiĭ, 2010), ‘Estonian Russian’ (“Professor”, 
2016; Strakov, 2016; Zabrodskaja, 2006), ‘Latvian Russian’ (Berdicevskis, 
2014; Bobrikova, 2005; “Nash latyshskiĭ russkiĭ iazyk”, 2005), ‘Lithuanian 
Russian’ (Avina, 2006; Osipov, 2014; Zverko, 2014), ‘Kazakh (Kazakhstani) 
Russian’ (Dzhundubaeva, 2016; Zhumabekova & Mirozoeva, 2015, p. 
51; Zhuravleva, 2012), ‘Moldovan Russian’ (“Lekant”, 2015; Serov, 2017; 
Tudose, 2006), and ‘Ukrainian Russian’ (Kazdobina, 2017; Pugovskiĭ, 2014; 
Rudiakov, 2008; Simferopol’, 2009; Stepanov, 2013, p. 219), or in other 
words, on the state-specific varieties within the so-called ‘Great Russian’ 
dialectal area. The intensity of this discussion reflects Moscow’s increasingly 
heightened claim to this vast area for the very ‘cultural’ core of the ‘Russian 
world’, and the only to be expected disagreement on the part of the post-
Soviet countries concerned to such an outside imposition. This discussion 
is rounded up with a reflection on ‘Russian (i.e. Russkii or Rossiiskii) 
Russian’ (Berdicevskis, 2014; Mikhailov, 1988, p. 47; Rudiakov, 2010, pp. 
51, 70; Terkulov, 2012) and the unexpected phenomenon of ‘Israeli Russian’ 
(Elenevskaia & Ovchinnikova, 2015, p. 231; GS, 2011; Nosonovskiĭ, 2017), 
alongside the sociolinguistic and political status of Surzhyk in Ukraine 
(Bilaniuk, 2004; Hentschel & Zaprudski, 2008; Hentschel, Taranenko, & 
Zaprudski, 2014) and of Trasianka in Belarus (Hentschel & Zaprudski, 
2008; Hentschel et al., 2014).
Decisively less attention is paid to state-specific varieties in other post-
Soviet states with relatively tiny native (L1) Russian-speaking communities 
living there. Russian is employed in these polities predominantly as a 
de-ethnicized foreign (second, L2) language of wider communication, 
nowadays frequently in direct competition with English that fulfils the very 
same function. The Kremlin does not claim these countries for the cultural-
cum-political core of the ‘Russian world’, their membership in the Russian-
led Eurasian Union is deemed sufficient (only Georgia stays away). Hence, 
8 Russia’s 2014 military seizure of Crimea from Ukraine is not internationally recognized. In 
light of international law, this Ukrainian territory is under Russian occupation.
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the populations and elites of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan are less interested in discussing 
or developing, respectively, ‘Armenian Russian’ (Grigorian, 2006, p. 21; 
“Lekant”, 2015), ‘Azeri (Azerbaijani) Russian’ (Kaushanskiĭ & Mamedov, 
2009; “Novyĭ bakinskiĭ dialekt”, 2007), ‘Georgian Russian’ (Chernorechenski, 
2012; Khramov, 2016; “Oteli”, 2017), ‘Kyrgyz (Kyrgyzstani) Russian’9 
(“Russkiĭ iazyk”, 2013), ‘Tajik (Tajikistani) Russian’ (“Logicheskuiu”, 2015), 
‘Turkmen (Turkmenistani) Russian’ (Azymov, Ershova, & Bailiev, 1991), 
or ‘Uzbek (Uzbekistani) Russian’ (Avrukinesque, 2007; Shafranskaia, 2009; 
“Tashkentskiĭ dialekt”, 2017). In Russophone literature these state-specific 
Russians are rarely referred to in these terms, while the older imperial 
and Soviet usage is preferred, namely, construing the aforesaid varieties 
as ‘Russian dialects’ of these polities’ capitals. Hence, the Russian dialects 
of Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, Bishkek, Dushanbe, Ashghabat (Aşgabat), or 
Tashkent (Toshkent).The Russo-Ukrainian War and the Russian  Language Question
This lukewarm approach to the question whether Russian is a 
monocentric or pluricentric language, whether only Russia has the right to 
‘own’ and control it, or maybe this privilege should be shared at least with all 
the interested post-Soviet states and Israel, changed decisively in the mid-
2010s. This change in attitudes was directly connected with the pro-Russian 
Viktor Yanukovych (Ianukovych) administration in Ukraine, which 
attempted to introduce Russian as a co-official language in this country. 
Many Ukrainians feared that the Belarusian scenario would be repeated. 
The 1995 introduction of Russian as co-official in Belarus marginalized this 
country’s national and state language of Belarusian, in which now fewer 
than 10 per cent of book titles are published (Moser, 2014; “Tol’ki 8,5% 
knig”, 2012). Opponents of this policy proposed that instead of according 
such status to Russian in Ukraine, rather a ‘Ukrainian Russian’ should be 
acknowledged and developed as different from Russia’s Russian. Scholarly 
research on the Ukrainian variety of the Russian language commenced 
in 2008 (Rudiakov, 2008), and at the turn of the 2010s the emergence of 
Ukrainian Russian became widely recognized as much as it was opposed by 
proponents of monocentric Russian with its cultural centre in Moscow and 
St Petersburg (“Aleksandr Rudiakov”, 2010). 
The discussion on Ukrainian Russian grew even more polarized and 
9 In spite of quite an extensive search to this end, thus far I have not found the Russian-language 
collocation ‘Kyrgyz (Kyrgyzstani) Russian’, be it in a printed source or on the web.
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divisive in the wake of the 2013-14 (Euromaidan) Revolution of Dignity, 
which toppled President Yanukovych and thus reversed the process of 
making Russian a co-official but de facto the dominant language of Ukraine. 
The balance of public opinion in favour of Ukrainian Russian was tipped 
decisively by Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the Russian attack in 
the same year on eastern Ukraine that produced the de facto polities of the 
Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk (Luhansk) People’s Republic. 
The Russo-Ukrainian War rages to this day (2018). Most consented that 
a Ukrainian standard of the Russian language must be adopted through a 
law in Ukraine and should be developed separately from Russia’s Russian 
(Bielokobyl’s’kyĭ, 2016; Grabovskiĭ, 2016; Hrabovs’kyĭ, 2016; Koshman, 
2014; “Neobkhodimo”, 2014). Already in 2015 a petition to this end was 
submitted to the Office of the President of Ukraine (Mel’nyk, 2015). Many 
Russophones, despite their loyalty to the Ukrainian nation, began to fear 
that in a single generation Russian would become a ‘kitchen language’ in 
Ukraine (perhaps in this manner tacitly acknowledging that this is the 
unenviable position of Ukrainian as a minority language in today’s Russia) 
(Gusev, 2017). The discourse on the status of the Ukrainian language 
and Ukrainian Russian became politicized to the point of the ideological 
denigration of the Russian language. For instance, it was proposed that 
the Ukrainian language was older than the Russian language (“Ukraïns’ka 
mova”, 2017), that Russian actually originated from Ukrainian (equated 
with Rus’an) (“Ukraïns’ke pokhodzhennia”, 2015), and that Russian was 
nothing more but a ‘distorted dialect’ of the Ukrainian language (Ptashka, 
2015). Finally, such emotional flare-ups gave way to more balanced views. 
For example, some maintain – quite sensibly – that neither Russian is a 
dialect of Ukrainian, nor Ukrainian a dialect of Russian. The Ukrainians 
and the Russians are separate nations in their own right, and as such they 
also have the inalienable right to their own separate languages of equal 
status as national and official Einzelsprachen, including Ukrainian Russian 
in Ukraine and Russian Russian in the Russian Federation (Lypchans’kyĭ, 
2017). On a more worrying note, after so much heated discussion on the 
subject, no legislation on Ukrainian Russian has been adopted to this day 
(2018), nor has any grammar or dictionary of Ukrainian Russian been 
produced yet. Hence, all the intensive discourse is back to square one. This 
retreat does not augur well for overhauling Russian as employed outside 
the territory of the Russian Federation into an officially acknowledged 
pluricentric language. If Ukraine under Russia’s continuing military attack 
does not dare, or its officials have no sufficient foresight, to press on with 
this sociolinguistic-cum-political change, none of the other post-Soviet 
states seems to be more ready to follow this path, either.
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The codifiers and official (academic and state) controllers of both 
Ukrainian and Russian draw on the very same North Slavic dialect continuum 
shared with other nation-states’ official languages, i.e. Belarusian, Czech, 
Polish and Slovak. Ideologies, scholarly concepts and theories, alongside 
political decisions – in other words ‘filters-cum-shapers’ – may be employed 
for dissecting a given chunk of a dialect continuum in a myriad of ways; the 
limit is the very boundaries of human imagination. Divisions imposed on a 
section of a dialect continuum (usually overlapping with the territory of an 
extant polity) are not set in stone, let alone provided by nature or any god. 
Each of these divisions is a result of a human decision (conscious or not), as 
carried out and maintained by a concerned human group, nowadays usually 
construed as a state (or a nation in its own state). The application of a certain 
‘filter-cum-shaper’ for delimiting a fragment of a dialect continuum for the 
sake of creating an Einzelsprache may be a neutral act, not contested by 
neighbouring human groups (i.e. states or speech communities, the latter 
often equated with nations in Central Europe). However, under different 
circumstances, it can be also an offensive act for the purpose of ‘justifying’ 
– for instance, in line with the political logic of ethnolinguistic nationalism 
– why a given language ‘is not a language’ at all, but ‘a mere dialect’ of the 
national and official Einzelsprache of this nation-state that has launched 
such an ideological onslaught of ‘linguistic’ character. An example of an 
‘epistemic’ attack of this type is the still widespread and persistent Russian 
idea that Belarusian and Ukrainian are ‘dialects’ of the (Great) Russian 
language.
Conventionally, language – its use for products of culture (fiction, 
theatre, or the mass media) or as a medium of education – is considered 
an instrument of ‘soft power’ (Nye, 2004). But as it could be observed in 
Ukraine, the Yanukovych regime’s arbitrary course of giving more berth 
to the official use of Russian in the country directly contributed to the 
growing grassroots opposition that culminated in bloody repressions. In 
turn, the 2013/2014 Revolution of Dignity broke out and subsequently 
toppled the delegitimized Yanukovych administration. The laws that 
boosted the official status of Russian in Ukraine were rescinded. This 
example proves that language may also be employed as a weapon in the 
arsenal of ‘hard power’, once again the only limit in this regard is the 
human mind’s capacity for imagining and generating the social reality 
(cf. Kowalski, 2015). The traditional cultural organizations of former 
imperial powers, such as the British Council, Goethe Institut, Alliance 
Française, or the Instituto Cervantes traditionally were seen as a rather 
benign expression of the respective countries’ soft power (Nye, 2004, pp. 
108–109), although some saw them as instruments of cultural or linguistic 
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imperialism (cf. Phillipson, 1992; Thierfelder, 1940; Tomlinson, 1991). 
Branches of these organizations spread all over the world ostensibly to 
teach the former imperial languages of power and imperialism, now recast 
as languages of culture, cooperation and global-wide communication. 
Until recently insufficient attention has been paid to the political package 
of values and convictions that is tacitly transmitted in this process, while 
the former imperial countries (so-called ‘great powers’) usually refrained 
from overemphasizing this package or turning it into an element of hard 
power (cf. Burns, 2013). Beijing and Moscow seem to have no problems 
with this transition, and the two countries’ newly established counterparts 
of the aforementioned Western institutes of language and culture, namely 
the Confucius Institute and Russkii Mir,10 respectively, are unabashedly 
deployed also for hard power ends (cf. Chernyshuk, 2014; Pong & Feng, 
2017; Sukhankin, 2017; Volodzko, 2015). This ongoing weaponization of 
language, culture, the social sciences, and – by extension – of the social 
reality itself gave rise to the novel phenomenon of cyber war; meaning that 
soft power ‘turned rogue’. What is more, clear recognition of the military 
value of soft power technologized and enhanced through cyberspace 
allowed it to be deployed in the battlefield, alongside conventional troops, 
cannons and tanks, thus yielding the novel phenomenon of ‘hybrid war’, as 
simultaneously tested and waged by Russia in eastern Ukraine (Fitzpatrick, 
2017; Nye, 2017; Yashin, 2016).
With the realization that thinking about the linguistic, alongside 
scholarly rationalizations and conceptualizations regarding it, has a clear 
socio-political dimension, the question arises as to whether it is possible 
to limit the conflictual potential of how ‘filters-cum-shapers’ are applied to 
the linguistic. Obviously, this is possible, because languages and thinking 
about them are part and parcel of the social reality, which is generated 
and controlled by humans and their groups alone, not by nature or some 
divine presence. All depends, in this respect, on human will alone. In the 
case of the politics of the Russian language and its dialects, as discussed 
10 To a degree, the Russkii Mir Foundation builds on the decades-long experience of the Pushkin 
Institute (based in the Russian capital) that continues to function as a separate institution in its 
own right. This institute was founded in 1966 as part of Lomonosov Moscow State University. In 
1973 the Pushkin State Russian Language Institute gained institutional independence and be-
came the leading methodological centre for teaching Russian as a second language across the 
Soviet bloc and the world. During the Soviet period, this institute maintained methodological 
delegations in the Soviet bloc countries, but unlike Russkii Mir it never opened fully fledged 
branches in other countries. In turn, in 2010 Russkii Mir opened its own centre (Russkii tsentr) 
at the Pushkin Institute, the latter providing the former with methodological teaching expertise 
and materials. Between 1966 and 2015 half a million students from over 90 countries attended 
language courses and summer language schools offered by the Pushkin Institute (“Istoriia”, 2018).
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above, elements of the highest conflictual potential are two. The first one is 
the normative insistence – recently reinforced (i.e. politicized) by Russia’s 
official ideology of the Russkii Mir – on the monocentric character of the 
Russian language (equated, whenever convenient for the Kremlin, with the 
Russian nation). The other element is the continuing division of the Russian 
dialects into two conceptually and normatively (or politically) separate 
categories, namely (a) the ‘dialects of the traditional or imperial historical 
core’, and (b) (new) ‘territorial varieties’ as employed outside this core. The 
latter were produced by the Russian and Soviet imperial expansion during 
some two or three last centuries. This expansion both brought the (Great) 
Russian language and extended the North Slavic dialect continuum to 
geographically vast and ethnically non-Slavic areas, mostly in Asia, along 
the northern Black Sea littoral, and across the Caucasus.
At present Moscow treats Russian as a genuine language of international 
communication only in the post-Soviet states located in Asia and 
in the southern Caucasus. These states’ overwhelmingly non-Slavic, 
non-Slavophone and non-Orthodox populations speak and write the 
aforementioned ‘territorial varieties’ of Russian, although a reasonable 
command of this language tends to be limited to rather narrow intellectual, 
political and economic elites. Apart from a handful of Russian-speaking 
ethnic Slavs, such non-Slavic L2 speakers of Russian do not see Russian 
as a potentially native or national language. A commonality with the 
Rossiiskii – let alone, Russkii – narod is hardly attractive, or of any serious 
social or political interest to these elites and the population at large. These 
post-Soviet nation-states’ own non-Slavic national-cum-official languages 
successfully constitute an ideological foundation for these polities’ specific 
ethnolinguistic nationalisms. Russian is not any competitor in this regard. 
The Kremlin accepts this socio-political reality, which is impossible to 
change without outright annexation and a mass settlement campaign. At 
the present moment the Russian army is capable of a military action of this 
kind, but the Russian Federation being in demographic decline (DaVanzo 
& Adamson, 1997), the country has no pool of prospective settlers of ethnic 
Russkii or firmly Rossisskii background in order to flood any ‘newly re-
conquered’ lands. 
However, Moscow’s perception starkly differs in the case of the historical 
imperial core of (Great) Russian dialects, as equated with medieval (Kyivan) 
Rus’, nowadays commonly seen as ‘early Russia’ in Russian historiography 
and textbooks. In this area, at present split among quite a few nation-
states (Belarus, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, western 
[or ‘European’] Russia and Ukraine), Russian is spoken and written 
by Slavophones or linguistically Slavicized non-Slavs, who constitute a 
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territorially compact block of speakers of a variety of Einzelsprachen and 
dialects drawn from the North Slavic dialect continuum. On this linguistic 
(areal) basis, Moscow perceives these Slavophones as members of the (Great) 
Russian (that is, ideologically Russkii-ized Rossiiskii) nation, irrespective 
of what the concerned populations and their individual members may 
think about this neo-imperial approach of deciding about their identities 
from above and abroad. Furthermore, since 2015 when Russian military 
intervention commenced in Syria for the sake of propping up the faltering 
regime of pro-Russian Bashar al-Assad (“Russian Military”, 2018), it seems 
that the Kremlin plans to establish a permanent Russian foothold in the 
Middle East (Malovany, 2016; Winer, 2015). In this manner, the non-post-
Soviet polity of Israel found itself in the sights of the Russkii Mir ideology 
and Russia’s current Middle Eastern policies (IUdovin, 2017; Mironov, 
2015). It seems that Israel falls between the two aforementioned categories 
of the territorial subdivisions of the Russian language, namely the ‘historical 
dialects’ claimed as ethnically Russian (Russkii) and the ‘territorial varieties’ 
that are not immediately or necessarily of this ethnicity. However, Israel’s 
Russian-speakers in their vast majority stem from the ‘historical imperial 
core of Russian’s dialects’. Hence, in many ways Israel’s 1.2 million 
Russophones are perceived (and many also choose to see themselves) as 
belonging to the broad church-style post-imperial/neo-imperial Russian 
nation, a tad de-ethnicized to leave its access open to those who define 
themselves as Russkii, but do not feel a commonality either with Orthodox 
Christianity or Orthodox-influenced culture. In other words, such a 
person has a Rossiiskii identity, a modernized lowest common national 
denominator limited to Russian as a native (i.e. first, L1) language and to 
descent from ancestors who used to hold Soviet citizenship.Peace and Pluricentric Russian
The simplest way to defuse the conflictual nature of the current official 
Russian thinking on the Russian language would be to replace the traditional 
set of ‘filters-cum-shapers’ of the linguistic for another. For instance, the 
territorial extent of the historical dialects of the Russian language could be 
reimagined in Europe as limited to the territory of the Russian Federation. 
On the other hand, in the Asian section of this federation, the territorial 
varieties of Russian could be rebranded as historical dialects. As a result, 
the area of the dialects of Russia’s Russian would overlap with the territory 
of the Russian Federation (but perhaps with the exclusion of the territories 
of the polity’s autonomous republics). In order to stabilize this overlapping 
so that not a single Russian dialect would be ‘sticking outside’ Russia, 
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or a non-Russian one ‘poking’ into Russia, the Russian terms Russkii 
and Rossiiskii would need to be firmly equated. Perhaps, for the sake of 
improved inclusivity, Russkii could be fully replaced with Rossiiskii in 
this political role of the official ethnonym and linguonym of the Russian 
nation and its national language (cf. Demurin, 2016; Gabdrafikov, 2014; 
Granin, 2007; Tishkov, 2011; Vdovin, 1995, 2007). On the other hand, the 
employment of the concept of territorial varieties of Russian would need 
to be extended to all the states with large Russian-speaking populations 
or where this language is employed in an official capacity. Next the very 
term ‘territorial variety’ would need to be overhauled as ‘state variety of 
Russian’, obviously entailing the recognition of the pluricentric character 
of the Russian language. In this way Russia’s Russian would overlap with 
the territory of the Russian Federation, Ukrainian Russian with Ukraine, 
Israeli Russian with Israel, or Uzbek(istani) Russian with Uzbekistan. In 
turn, for the sake of research it would be possible to speak of the dialects of 
Ukrainian Russian and of the dialects of Tajik(istani) Russian as much as of 
the dialects of Russia’s (Rossiiskii) Russian. However, in order to defuse the 
potential for conflict in the current imaginings about the Russian language 
in the service of Russian politics, the Kremlin would need to give up the 
offensive use of the Russkii Mir ideology, a development that is unlikely in 
the near future.
As mentioned above, potentially at least 20 states could develop their 
own country-specific varieties of Russian (or Russian languages) for 
official, administrative, educational and computer use. If such varieties are 
seen as equal to other Slavic Einzelsprachen, the potential transformation 
of Russian into a pluricentric language could boost the current number of 
13 state Slavic languages (Belarusian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, 
Macedonian, Montenegrin, Polish, Serbian, Russian, Slovak, Slovenian and 
Ukrainian) to over 30. And because in essence humans are unpredictable, 
some of these state-specific varieties of Russian could be declared and made 
into languages in their own right. Then, a new category of post-Russian 
languages could emerge, not dissimilar to that of the post-Serbo-Croatian 
languages of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian. The most likely 
candidates for post-Russian languages are those varieties which are used 
in the states whose Russophone populations the proponents of the Russkii 
Mir ideology claim for the (Greater) Russian nation. As a result, Belarusian 
Russian, courtesy of its Belarusian-language name, could become a Raseian 
language; likewise, Estonian Russian – a Venean language; Israeli Russian – 
a Rusit language, Latvian Russian – a Krievu language, Lithuanian Russian 
– a Rusu language, Moldovan Russian – a Rusa language, Kazkhstani 
Russian – an Orys language, or Ukrainian Russian – a Rosiiska language.  
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The redefinition of Russian as a pluricentric language would helpfully 
decouple citizenship and national identity from language, so that Russian-
speakers in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Ukraine would cease being 
treated – be it by their home countries or by the Kremlin – as hostages of 
the neo-imperial ideology of the Russian World. As there are plenty world 
Russians, there may be equally numerous Russian worlds in the plural, 
conceived as country-specific Russophone cultures. In this new context of 
the firmly de-ethnicized Russian language, Moscow would not be able to 
(ab)use Russophone populaces in the neighbouring countries for the sake 
of pursuing territorial expansion. Conversely, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
or Ukraine would not need to be ever wary and fearful of the Kremlin’s 
intentions when pondering what their own Russophone citizens and 
residents might do when appealed to by Moscow. The Russian language 
would stop functioning as ‘fate’ or ‘destiny’, defined through the prism 
of ethnolinguistic nationalism in the service of the neo-imperial ideology 
of Russkii Mir. The accident of language would no longer condemn 
Russian-speakers living outside the Russian Federation to necessarily 
being members of the ethnolinguistically defined Russian nation, tied to 
‘their ideological nation-state’ as embodied by the Russian Federation. 
At long last Russophones living outside Russia could see the states of 
their residence as theirs too, with no Russian autocrat capable of credibly 
claiming their allegiance. In turn, the governments of these states would 
not have to be ever cautious about their Russian-speaking populations to 
the point of distrusting them, or even seeing them as ‘potential agents’ of 
the Kremlin.
A more stable and peaceful world is possible. A de-ethnicized pluricentric 
Russian language – thus overhauled into a colourful multiethnic and 
multicultural plenitude of world Russians – could be a versatile means to 
this end. The globe’s pluricentric Frenches or Englishes are a clear case in 
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Rosyjski: język monocentryczny  czy pluricentryczny? 
Wszystkie „duże” języki komunikacji międzynarodowej na świecie (na 
przykład angielski, francuski lub hiszpański) są pluricentryczne, czyli  ofi-
cjalne odmiany tych języków są inaczej standaryzowane w tych państwach, 
w których te języki są używane jako oficjalne. Jedynym wyjątkiem w tym za-
kresie jest język rosyjski. Pomimo faktu, że rosyjski funkcjonuje jako język 
oficjalny w wielu państwach postsowieckich oraz w Izraelu i Mongolii, to 
nadal uważa się go za język monocentryczny, którego normatywnie jednoli-
ty standard jest (i musi być) kontrolowany wyłącznie przez Rosję. Układ ten 
sprzeczny jest z zasadą suwerenności, bowiem zapewnia on Moskwie wpływ, 
a nawet kontrolę nad kulturą i używaniem języka w tych krajach, w których 
rosyjski to język urzędowy. Fakt ten został świadomie zauważony i wywołał 
gorące dyskusje w Ukrainie po rosyjskiej aneksji ukraińskiego regionu Krymu 
w roku 2014. Jak dotąd dyskusje te jednak nie przełożyły się na żadne ofi-
cjalne uznanie przez ukraińskie władze (nie mówiąc już o konkretnym 
wsparciu) ukraińskiej odmiany języka rosyjskiego.
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Słowa kluczowe: de-etnicyzacja, języki monocentryczne, język rosyjski, nie-
rosyjska ludność rosyjskojęzyczna, języki pluricentryczne, państwa rosyjskojęzyczne, 
państwowe odmiany języka rosyjskiego, polityka językowa, wojna hybrydowa, 
wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska. Note
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